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acl/lib_tls/tls/tls_server.c

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/*++
* NAME
* tls_server 3
* SUMMARY
* server-side TLS engine
* SYNOPSIS
* #include <tls.h>
*
* TLS_APPL_STATE *tls_server_init(props)
* const TLS_SERVER_INIT_PROPS *props;
*
* TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_server_start(props)
* const TLS_SERVER_START_PROPS *props;
*
* void tls_server_stop(app_ctx, stream, failure, TLScontext)
* TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx;
* VSTREAM *stream;
* int failure;
* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
* DESCRIPTION
* This module is the interface between Postfix TLS servers,
* the OpenSSL library, and the TLS entropy and cache manager.
*
* tls_server_init() is called once when the SMTP server
* initializes.
* Certificate details are also decided during this phase,
* so that peer-specific behavior is not possible.
*
* tls_server_start() activates the TLS feature for the VSTREAM
* passed as argument. We assume that network buffers are flushed
* and the TLS handshake can begin immediately.
*
* tls_server_stop() sends the "close notify" alert via
* SSL_shutdown() to the peer and resets all connection specific
* TLS data. As RFC2487 does not specify a separate shutdown, it
* is assumed that the underlying TCP connection is shut down
* immediately afterwards. Any further writes to the channel will
* be discarded, and any further reads will report end-of-file.
* If the failure flag is set, no SSL_shutdown() handshake is performed.
*
* Once the TLS connection is initiated, information about the TLS
* state is available via the TLScontext structure:
* .IP TLScontext->protocol
* the protocol name (SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1),
* .IP TLScontext->cipher_name
* the cipher name (e.g. RC4/MD5),
* .IP TLScontext->cipher_usebits
* the number of bits actually used (e.g. 40),
* .IP TLScontext->cipher_algbits
* the number of bits the algorithm is based on (e.g. 128).
* .PP
* The last two values may differ from each other when export-strength
* encryption is used.
*
* If the peer offered a certificate, part of the certificate data are
* available as:
* .IP TLScontext->peer_status
* A bitmask field that records the status of the peer certificate
* verification. One or more of TLS_CERT_FLAG_PRESENT and
* TLS_CERT_FLAG_TRUSTED.
* .IP TLScontext->peer_CN
* Extracted CommonName of the peer, or zero-length string
* when information could not be extracted.
* .IP TLScontext->issuer_CN
* Extracted CommonName of the issuer, or zero-length string
* when information could not be extracted.
* .IP TLScontext->peer_fingerprint
* Fingerprint of the certificate, or zero-length string when no peer
* certificate is available.
* .PP
* If no peer certificate is presented the peer_status is set to 0.
* LICENSE
* .ad
* .fi
* This software is free. You can do with it whatever you want.
* The original author kindly requests that you acknowledge
* the use of his software.
* AUTHOR(S)
* Originally written by:
* Lutz Jaenicke
* BTU Cottbus
* Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
* Universitaetsplatz 3-4
* D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
*
* Updated by:
* Wietse Venema
* IBM T.J. Watson Research
* P.O. Box 704
* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
*
* Victor Duchovni
* Morgan Stanley
*--*/
#include "StdAfx.h"
#ifdef USE_TLS
#ifdef ACL_UNIX
# include <unistd.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include "dict.h"
/* Global library. */
#include "tls_params.h"
/* TLS library. */
#include "tls.h"
#include "tls_mgr.h"
#include "tls_private.h"
#define STR(x) acl_vstring_str(x)
#define LEN(x) ACL_VSTRING_LEN(x)
/* Application-specific. */
/*
* The session_id_context indentifies the service that created a session.
* This information is used to distinguish between multiple TLS-based
* servers running on the same server. We use the name of the mail system.
*/
static const char server_session_id_context[] = "Postfix/TLS";
#define GEN_CACHE_ID(buf, id, len, service) \
do { \
buf = acl_vstring_alloc(2 * (len) + 1 + strlen(service) + 3); \
acl_hex_encode(buf, (char *) (id), (len)); \
acl_vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "&s=%s", (service)); \
} while (0)
/* get_server_session_cb - callback to retrieve session from server cache */
static SSL_SESSION *get_server_session_cb(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *session_id,
int session_id_length, int *unused_copy acl_unused)
{
const char *myname = "get_server_session_cb";
TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
ACL_VSTRING *cache_id;
ACL_VSTRING *session_data = acl_vstring_alloc(2048);
SSL_SESSION *session = 0;
if ((TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, TLScontext_index)) == 0)
acl_msg_panic("%s: null TLScontext in session lookup callback", myname);
GEN_CACHE_ID(cache_id, session_id, session_id_length, TLScontext->serverid);
if (TLScontext->log_level >= 2)
acl_msg_info("%s: looking up session %s in %s cache", TLScontext->namaddr,
STR(cache_id), TLScontext->cache_type);
/*
* Load the session from cache and decode it.
*/
if (tls_mgr_lookup(TLScontext->cache_type, STR(cache_id),
session_data) == TLS_MGR_STAT_OK) {
session = tls_session_activate(STR(session_data), (int) LEN(session_data));
if (session && (TLScontext->log_level >= 2))
acl_msg_info("%s: reloaded session %s from %s cache",
TLScontext->namaddr, STR(cache_id),
TLScontext->cache_type);
}
/*
* Clean up.
*/
acl_vstring_free(cache_id);
acl_vstring_free(session_data);
return (session);
}
#if 0
/* uncache_session - remove session from internal & external cache */
static void uncache_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
{
ACL_VSTRING *cache_id;
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(TLScontext->con);
SSL_CTX_remove_session(ctx, session);
if (TLScontext->cache_type == 0)
return;
GEN_CACHE_ID(cache_id, session->session_id, session->session_id_length,
TLScontext->serverid);
if (TLScontext->log_level >= 2)
acl_msg_info("%s: remove session %s from %s cache", TLScontext->namaddr,
STR(cache_id), TLScontext->cache_type);
tls_mgr_delete(TLScontext->cache_type, STR(cache_id));
acl_vstring_free(cache_id);
}
#endif
/* new_server_session_cb - callback to save session to server cache */
static int new_server_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
{
const char *myname = "new_server_session_cb";
ACL_VSTRING *cache_id;
TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
ACL_VSTRING *session_data;
if ((TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, TLScontext_index)) == 0)
acl_msg_panic("%s: null TLScontext in new session callback", myname);
GEN_CACHE_ID(cache_id, session->session_id, session->session_id_length,
TLScontext->serverid);
if (TLScontext->log_level >= 2)
acl_msg_info("%s: save session %s to %s cache", TLScontext->namaddr,
STR(cache_id), TLScontext->cache_type);
/*
* Passivate and save the session state.
*/
session_data = tls_session_passivate(session);
if (session_data) {
tls_mgr_update(TLScontext->cache_type, STR(cache_id),
STR(session_data), (int) LEN(session_data));
/*
* Clean up.
*/
acl_vstring_free(session_data);
}
acl_vstring_free(cache_id);
SSL_SESSION_free(session); /* 200502 */
return (1);
}
/* tls_server_int - initialize the server-side TLS engine */
void tls_server_init()
{
tls_params_init();
if (!var_tlsmgr_stand_alone)
tlsmgr_local_start(NULL);
tls_threads_init();
}
/* tls_server_setup - setup the server-side TLS engine */
int tls_server_setup(const TLS_SERVER_INIT_PROPS *props)
{
const char *myname = "tls_server_setup";
const EVP_MD *md_alg;
unsigned int md_len;
if (props->log_level >= 2)
acl_msg_info("initializing the server-side TLS engine");
/*
* Detect mismatch between compile-time headers and run-time library.
*/
tls_check_version();
/*
* Initialize the OpenSSL library by the book! To start with, we must
* initialize the algorithms. We want cleartext error messages instead of
* just error codes, so we load the error_strings.
*/
SSL_load_error_strings();
OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
/*
* Create an application data index for SSL objects, so that we can
* attach TLScontext information; this information is needed inside
* tls_verify_certificate_callback().
*/
if (TLScontext_index < 0) {
if ((TLScontext_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) < 0) {
acl_msg_warn("%s: Cannot allocate SSL application data index: "
"disabling TLS support", myname);
return (-1);
}
}
/*
* If the administrator specifies an unsupported digest algorithm, fail
* now, rather than in the middle of a TLS handshake.
*/
if ((md_alg = EVP_get_digestbyname(props->fpt_dgst)) == 0) {
acl_msg_warn("%s: Digest algorithm \"%s\" not found: disabling TLS support",
myname, props->fpt_dgst);
return (-1);
}
/*
* Sanity check: Newer shared libraries may use larger digests.
*/
if ((md_len = EVP_MD_size(md_alg)) > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
acl_msg_warn("%s: Digest algorithm \"%s\" output size %u too large:"
" disabling TLS support", myname, props->fpt_dgst, md_len);
return (-1);
}
/*
* Initialize the PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator) with some seed
* from external and internal sources. Don't enable TLS without some real
* entropy.
*/
if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 0 && tls_ext_seed(var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes) < 0) {
acl_msg_warn("%s: no entropy for TLS key generation: disabling TLS support", myname);
return (-1);
}
tls_int_seed();
return (0);
}
TLS_APPL_STATE *tls_server_create(const TLS_SERVER_INIT_PROPS *props)
{
const char *myname = "tls_server_create";
SSL_CTX *server_ctx;
long off = 0;
int verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
int cachable;
int protomask;
TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx;
tls_mgr_open(NULL);
/*
* First validate the protocols. If these are invalid, we can't continue.
*/
protomask = tls_protocol_mask(props->protocols);
if (protomask == TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID) {
/* tls_protocol_mask() logs no warning. */
acl_msg_warn("%s: Invalid TLS protocol list \"%s\": disabling TLS support",
myname, props->protocols);
return (0);
}
/*
* The SSL/TLS specifications require the client to send a message in the
* oldest specification it understands with the highest level it
* understands in the message. Netscape communicator can still
* communicate with SSLv2 servers, so it sends out a SSLv2 client hello.
* To deal with it, our server must be SSLv2 aware (even if we don't like
* SSLv2), so we need to have the SSLv23 server here. If we want to limit
* the protocol level, we can add an option to not use SSLv2/v3/TLSv1
* later.
*/
ERR_clear_error();
if ((server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())) == 0) {
acl_msg_warn("%s: cannot allocate server SSL_CTX: disabling TLS support", myname);
tls_print_errors();
return (0);
}
/*
* See the verify callback in tls_verify.c
*/
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(server_ctx, props->verifydepth + 1);
/*
* Protocol work-arounds, OpenSSL version dependent.
*/
off |= tls_bug_bits();
SSL_CTX_set_options(server_ctx, off);
/*
* Global protocol selection.
*/
if (protomask != 0)
SSL_CTX_set_options(server_ctx,
((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1) ? SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 : 0L)
| ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv3) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 : 0L)
| ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv2) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 : 0L));
/*
* Set the call-back routine to debug handshake progress.
*/
if (props->log_level >= 2)
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(server_ctx, tls_info_callback);
/*
* Load the CA public key certificates for both the server cert and for
* the verification of client certificates. As provided by OpenSSL we
* support two types of CA certificate handling: One possibility is to
* add all CA certificates to one large CAfile, the other possibility is
* a directory pointed to by CApath, containing separate files for each
* CA with softlinks named after the hash values of the certificate. The
* first alternative has the advantage that the file is opened and read
* at startup time, so that you don't have the hassle to maintain another
* copy of the CApath directory for chroot-jail.
*/
if (tls_set_ca_certificate_info(server_ctx, props->CAfile, props->CApath) < 0) {
/* tls_set_ca_certificate_info() already logs a warning. */
SSL_CTX_free(server_ctx); /* 200411 */
return (0);
}
/*
* Load the server public key certificate and private key from file and
* check whether the cert matches the key. We can use RSA certificates
* ("cert") DSA certificates ("dcert") or ECDSA certificates ("eccert").
* All three can be made available at the same time. The CA certificates
* for all three are handled in the same setup already finished. Which
* one is used depends on the cipher negotiated (that is: the first
* cipher listed by the client which does match the server). A client
* with RSA only (e.g. Netscape) will use the RSA certificate only. A
* client with openssl-library will use RSA first if not especially
* changed in the cipher setup.
*/
if (tls_set_my_certificate_key_info(server_ctx,
props->cert_file,
props->key_file,
props->dcert_file,
props->dkey_file,
props->eccert_file,
props->eckey_file) < 0) {
/* tls_set_my_certificate_key_info() already logs a warning. */
SSL_CTX_free(server_ctx); /* 200411 */
return (0);
}
/*
* According to the OpenSSL documentation, temporary RSA key is needed
* export ciphers are in use. We have to provide one, so well, we just do
* it.
*/
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(server_ctx, tls_tmp_rsa_cb);
/*
* Diffie-Hellman key generation parameters can either be loaded from
* files (preferred) or taken from compiled in values. First, set the
* callback that will select the values when requested, then load the
* (possibly) available DH parameters from files. We are generous with
* the error handling, since we do have default values compiled in, so we
* will not abort but just log the error message.
*/
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(server_ctx, tls_tmp_dh_cb);
if (*props->dh1024_param_file != 0)
tls_set_dh_from_file(props->dh1024_param_file, 1024);
if (*props->dh512_param_file != 0)
tls_set_dh_from_file(props->dh512_param_file, 512);
/*
* Enable EECDH if available, errors are not fatal, we just keep going
* with any remaining key-exchange algorithms.
*/
(void) tls_set_eecdh_curve(server_ctx, props->eecdh_grade);
/*
* If we want to check client certificates, we have to indicate it in
* advance. By now we only allow to decide on a global basis. If we want
* to allow certificate based relaying, we must ask the client to provide
* one with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The client now can decide, whether it
* provides one or not. We can enforce a failure of the negotiation with
* SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, if we do not allow a connection
* without one. In the "server hello" following the initialization by the
* "client hello" the server must provide a list of CAs it is willing to
* accept. Some clever clients will then select one from the list of
* available certificates matching these CAs. Netscape Communicator will
* present the list of certificates for selecting the one to be sent, or
* it will issue a warning, if there is no certificate matching the
* available CAs.
*
* With regard to the purpose of the certificate for relaying, we might like
* a later negotiation, maybe relaying would already be allowed for other
* reasons, but this would involve severe changes in the internal postfix
* logic, so we have to live with it the way it is.
*/
if (props->ask_ccert)
verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
SSL_CTX_set_verify(server_ctx, verify_flags,
tls_verify_certificate_callback);
if (*props->CAfile)
SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(server_ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(props->CAfile));
/*
* Initialize our own TLS server handle, before diving into the details
* of TLS session cache management.
*/
app_ctx = tls_alloc_app_context(server_ctx);
/*
* The session cache is implemented by the tlsmgr(8) server.
*
* XXX 200502 Surprise: when OpenSSL purges an entry from the in-memory
* cache, it also attempts to purge the entry from the on-disk cache.
* This is undesirable, especially when we set the in-memory cache size
* to 1. For this reason we don't allow OpenSSL to purge on-disk cache
* entries, and leave it up to the tlsmgr process instead. Found by
* Victor Duchovni.
*/
if (props->cache_type == 0 || tls_mgr_policy(props->cache_type, &cachable) != TLS_MGR_STAT_OK)
cachable = 0;
if (cachable || props->set_sessid) {
/*
* Initialize the session cache.
*
* With a large number of concurrent smtpd(8) processes, it is not a
* good idea to cache multiple large session objects in each process.
* We set the internal cache size to 1, and don't register a
* "remove_cb" so as to avoid deleting good sessions from the
* external cache prematurely (when the internal cache is full,
* OpenSSL removes sessions from the external cache also)!
*
* This makes SSL_CTX_remove_session() not useful for flushing broken
* sessions from the external cache, so we must delete them directly
* (not via a callback).
*
* Set a session id context to identify to what type of server process
* created a session. In our case, the context is simply the name of
* the mail system: "Postfix/TLS".
*/
SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(server_ctx, 1);
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(server_ctx,
(void *) &server_session_id_context,
sizeof(server_session_id_context));
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(server_ctx,
SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER |
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
if (cachable) {
app_ctx->cache_type = acl_mystrdup(props->cache_type);
SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(server_ctx, get_server_session_cb);
SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(server_ctx, new_server_session_cb);
}
/*
* OpenSSL ignores timed-out sessions. We need to set the internal
* cache timeout at least as high as the external cache timeout. This
* applies even if no internal cache is used.
*/
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(server_ctx, props->scache_timeout);
} else {
/*
* If we have no external cache, disable all caching. No use wasting
* server memory resources with sessions they are unlikely to be able
* to reuse.
*/
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(server_ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
}
return (app_ctx);
}
/*
* This is the actual startup routine for a new connection. We expect that
* the SMTP buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was sent to
* the client, so that we can immediately start the TLS handshake process.
*/
TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_server_start(const TLS_SERVER_START_PROPS *props)
{
const char *myname = "tls_server_start";
int sts;
TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
X509 *peer;
char buf[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
const char *cipher_list;
TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx = props->ctx;
if (props->log_level >= 1)
acl_msg_info("%s: setting up TLS connection from %s",
myname, props->namaddr);
cipher_list = tls_set_ciphers(app_ctx, "TLS", props->cipher_grade,
props->cipher_exclusions);
if (cipher_list == 0) {
acl_msg_warn("%s: %s: %s: aborting TLS session",
myname, props->namaddr, acl_vstring_str(app_ctx->why));
return (0);
}
if (props->log_level >= 2)
acl_msg_info("%s: %s: TLS cipher list \"%s\"",
myname, props->namaddr, cipher_list);
/*
* Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
* structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later retrieve
* the information inside the tls_verify_certificate_callback().
*/
TLScontext = tls_alloc_sess_context(props->log_level, props->namaddr);
TLScontext->cache_type = app_ctx->cache_type;
TLScontext->serverid = acl_mystrdup(props->serverid);
TLScontext->am_server = 1;
ERR_clear_error();
if ((TLScontext->con = (SSL *) SSL_new(app_ctx->ssl_ctx)) == 0) {
acl_msg_warn("%s: Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()", myname);
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
acl_msg_warn("%s: Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'", myname);
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/*
* The TLS connection is realized by a BIO_pair, so obtain the pair.
*
* XXX There is no need to store the internal_bio handle in the TLScontext
* structure. It will be attached to and destroyed with TLScontext->con.
* The network_bio, however, needs to be freed explicitly, so we need to
* store its handle in TLScontext.
*/
if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&TLScontext->internal_bio, TLS_BIO_BUFSIZE,
&TLScontext->network_bio, TLS_BIO_BUFSIZE)) {
acl_msg_warn("%s: Could not obtain BIO_pair", myname);
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/*
* Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
* more.
*/
tls_int_seed();
if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 0)
(void) tls_ext_seed(var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
/*
* Initialize the SSL connection to accept state. This should not be
* necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
* and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
*/
SSL_set_accept_state(TLScontext->con);
/*
* Connect the SSL connection with the Postfix side of the BIO-pair for
* reading and writing.
*/
SSL_set_bio(TLScontext->con, TLScontext->internal_bio,
TLScontext->internal_bio);
/*
* If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is dumped:
* 3 will dump the SSL negotiation, 4 will dump everything.
*
* We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
* Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
* created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
*/
if (props->log_level >= 3)
BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), tls_bio_dump_cb);
/*
* Start TLS negotiations. This process is a black box that invokes our
* call-backs for session caching and certificate verification.
*
* Error handling: If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message
* and remove all TLS state concerning this session.
*/
sts = tls_bio_accept(ACL_VSTREAM_SOCK(props->stream), props->timeout,
TLScontext);
if (sts <= 0) {
acl_msg_info("SSL_accept error from %s: %d", props->namaddr, sts);
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/* Only loglevel==4 dumps everything */
if (props->log_level < 4)
BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), 0);
/*
* The caller may want to know if this session was reused or if a new
* session was negotiated.
*/
TLScontext->session_reused = SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con);
if (TLScontext->log_level >= 2 && TLScontext->session_reused)
acl_msg_info("%s: Reusing old session", TLScontext->namaddr);
/*
* Let's see whether a peer certificate is available and what is the
* actual information. We want to save it for later use.
*/
peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con);
if (peer != NULL) {
TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_PRESENT;
if (SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con) == X509_V_OK)
TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_TRUSTED;
if (props->log_level >= 2) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer),
buf, sizeof(buf));
acl_msg_info("subject=%s", buf);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
buf, sizeof(buf));
acl_msg_info("issuer=%s", buf);
}
TLScontext->peer_CN = tls_peer_CN(peer, TLScontext);
TLScontext->issuer_CN = tls_issuer_CN(peer, TLScontext);
TLScontext->peer_fingerprint = tls_fingerprint(peer, props->fpt_dgst);
if (props->log_level >= 1) {
acl_msg_info("%s: %s: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s, fingerprint=%s",
props->namaddr,
TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted",
TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN,
TLScontext->peer_fingerprint);
}
X509_free(peer);
} else {
TLScontext->peer_CN = acl_mystrdup("");
TLScontext->issuer_CN = acl_mystrdup("");
TLScontext->peer_fingerprint = acl_mystrdup("");
}
/*
* Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
*/
TLScontext->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
TLScontext->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
TLScontext->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
&(TLScontext->cipher_algbits));
/*
* The TLS engine is active. Switch to the tls_timed_read/write()
* functions and make the TLScontext available to those functions.
*/
tls_stream_start(props->stream, TLScontext);
/*
* All the key facts in a single log entry.
*/
if (props->log_level >= 1)
acl_msg_info("%s TLS connection established from %s: %s with cipher %s "
"(%d/%d bits)", !TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(TLScontext) ? "Anonymous"
: TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted",
props->namaddr, TLScontext->protocol, TLScontext->cipher_name,
TLScontext->cipher_usebits, TLScontext->cipher_algbits);
tls_int_seed();
return (TLScontext);
}
#endif /* USE_TLS */
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