mirror of
https://gitee.com/fasiondog/hikyuu.git
synced 2024-12-05 05:17:47 +08:00
161 lines
5.6 KiB
C
161 lines
5.6 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.13 2015/01/12 03:20:04 tedu Exp $ */
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org>
|
|
*
|
|
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
|
|
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
|
|
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
|
|
*
|
|
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
|
|
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
|
|
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
|
|
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
|
|
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
|
|
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
|
|
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
|
|
#include "pycabcrypt.h"
|
|
#include "blf.h"
|
|
#include "sha2.h"
|
|
|
|
#define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash
|
|
*
|
|
* The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing
|
|
* function with the following modifications:
|
|
* 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512.
|
|
* 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits.
|
|
* 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modifed
|
|
* to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"
|
|
* 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state
|
|
* expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.)
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller
|
|
* as a performance optimization.
|
|
*
|
|
* One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material
|
|
* linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to
|
|
* generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an
|
|
* attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user
|
|
* always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the
|
|
* entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a
|
|
* wise caller could do; we just do it for you.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define BCRYPT_WORDS 8
|
|
#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4)
|
|
|
|
static void bcrypt_hash(uint8_t *sha2pass, uint8_t *sha2salt, uint8_t *out) {
|
|
blf_ctx state;
|
|
uint8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE + 1] = {"OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"};
|
|
uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS];
|
|
int i;
|
|
uint16_t j;
|
|
size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
/* key expansion */
|
|
Blowfish_initstate(&state);
|
|
Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
|
|
Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen);
|
|
Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* encryption */
|
|
j = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++)
|
|
cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext), &j);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
|
|
blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t));
|
|
|
|
/* copy out */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) {
|
|
out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff;
|
|
out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff;
|
|
out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff;
|
|
out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* zap */
|
|
explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext));
|
|
explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata));
|
|
explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const uint8_t *salt, size_t saltlen,
|
|
uint8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds) {
|
|
SHA2_CTX ctx;
|
|
uint8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
|
|
uint8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
|
|
uint8_t countsalt[4];
|
|
size_t i, j, amt, stride;
|
|
uint32_t count;
|
|
size_t origkeylen = keylen;
|
|
|
|
/* nothing crazy */
|
|
if (rounds < 1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 || keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out);
|
|
amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride;
|
|
|
|
/* collapse password */
|
|
SHA512Init(&ctx);
|
|
SHA512Update(&ctx, pass, passlen);
|
|
SHA512Final(sha2pass, &ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */
|
|
for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) {
|
|
countsalt[0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff;
|
|
countsalt[1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff;
|
|
countsalt[2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
|
|
countsalt[3] = count & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
/* first round, salt is salt */
|
|
SHA512Init(&ctx);
|
|
SHA512Update(&ctx, salt, saltlen);
|
|
SHA512Update(&ctx, countsalt, sizeof(countsalt));
|
|
SHA512Final(sha2salt, &ctx);
|
|
bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
|
|
memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out));
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) {
|
|
/* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */
|
|
SHA512Init(&ctx);
|
|
SHA512Update(&ctx, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout));
|
|
SHA512Final(sha2salt, &ctx);
|
|
bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++)
|
|
out[j] ^= tmpout[j];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly.
|
|
*/
|
|
amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) {
|
|
size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1);
|
|
if (dest >= origkeylen)
|
|
break;
|
|
key[dest] = out[i];
|
|
}
|
|
keylen -= i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* zap */
|
|
explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
|
|
explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|